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STATE APPELLATE COURTS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: WRITTEN OBSCENITY
D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.*
A great commandment of our Lady of the Common Law: Thou
shalt not make unto thyself any graven image-of maxims or
formulas to wit.
-Sir Frederick Pollock1
This article will draw several hypotheses and conclusions concern-
ing the operation of state appellate courts on the basis of a case exami-
nation in Florida. What can one learn about state judiciaries from the
way in which appellate courts in Florida have treated the subject of
written obscenity? The subject is a litigious one today both in state and
federal courts.2 Written obscenity centers on the morality of the com-
munity and the courts' relationship to that morality. A case of written
obscenity presents the judges with the task of applying some external
standard to matters before them, and directly involves them in the emo-
tions and feelings of a particular community.
The territorial and early statehood history of Florida was virtually
bare of obscenity legislation. Prior to the Civil War state statutes and
published court reports made no reference to the subject, though this
silence was not uncommon in many of the other states during this period.'
Explaining why legislators failed to pass certain laws or why particular
types of litigation failed to materialize is often more difficult than ex-
plaining the origins of enacted statutes and decided cases. A statute pre-
sents the opportunity to focus on the web of forces and the pressures
which interacted to produce the law. Similarly, a case draws together
*A.B, Davidson College, 1964; M.A., Princeton University, 1966; Ph.D, Princeton
University, 1967. Member of the faculty of The National War College.
1. Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L.Q. REv. 163, 169 (1923).
2. For background on obscenity statutes and cases in the United States see M. Easr
& A. SciwARuz, THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE (1964); To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT (J.
Chandos ed. 1962); VERSIONS OF CENSORSMIP (J. McCormick & M. Macinnes eds. 1962);
Baiter, Some Observations Concerning the Federal Obscenity Statutes, 8 S. CAL. L.
REV. 267 (1935); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Lockhart & McClure, Literature,
the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); Zuckman,
Obscenity in the Mails, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 171 (1960).
3. See generally Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954).
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opposing sides with conflicting claims, and a court decision represents a
choice of values and a preference for certain interests at stake in the
litigation. The case and the statute, then, expose for examination in-
terests, feelings, and tensions perhaps muted or nonexistent before.
Without the expressed opinions found in statutory debates and judicial
argument, however, the search for the causal continues amidst an abun-
dance of uncertainty and speculation.
The passage of obscenity laws was probably dependent more on the
state of the public mind than on the quantity of material available for
sale and distribution. One would be unreasonable to suppose that ob-
scenity legislation appeared when a certain absolute level of circulation
was reached, like a light's flashing when the temperature reached a
danger point. Instead, if one could say that legislation reflected the
desires of some group in the body politic, the passage of obscenity laws
indicated a crisis point in the minds of some who felt that the state should
curb the evil. An increase in the quantity of available matter would not
be necessary to spark the legislation, for what was needed was a change
in attitude toward whatever amount of material was present.
The Florida legislature first adopted a statute against obscene material
in 1868:
Whoever imports, prints, publishes, sells, or distributes any book,
pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, or other thing, containing obscene
language, or any obscene prints, figures, pictures, or descriptions,
manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, or
introduces into any family, school, or place of education, or buys,
procures, receives, or has in his possession any such book, . . .
shall be punished by imprisonment . . . and fine .... 4
The focus was on youth, the home, and the school, and the statute ex-
plicitly forbade books containing any obscene passages. Presumably,
some irreverent Floridian could have applied the statute to the Bible to
rid most Florida families of their only printed possession, though no
record remains of any such attempt.
The statute was part of the movement to erase what many felt to be a
plaguing mark on the nation's character; 5 it exhibited signs of distinctly
4. FLA. LAws ch. 1637, sub. ch., 8, § 15 (1868).
5. Anthony Comstock led the efforts to purify the nation's morals. See H. BROWN
& M. LEEcH, ANHONY CoMsrocn: ROUNDSMAN oF Tn LoRD (1927); Foster, The "Corn-
stock Load"--Obscenity and the Law, 48 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 245 (1957).
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English influence.8 Lord Campbell had sired his Obscene Publications
Act in 1857, and in the debates in the House of Lords on the bill, its
author explained that the law would apply to works written for the
purpose of corrupting the morals of youth.7 In 1868, the year of the
enactment of the Florida statute, Chief Justice Cockburn announced the
test for obscenity in the Hicklin case.8 In this first interpretation of the
British act, Cockburn broadened Lord Campbell's definition to include
more than material written with the singular purpose of corrupting the
morals of young people.9 Obscene matter now became that which
tended to deprave and corrupt those whose minds were open to such im-
moral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall.1°
The Florida statute reflected the concern of both Lord Campbell and
Chief Justice Cockburn that the state protect the minds of youth from
obscene literature. The crucial distinction, of course, between the re-
spective views of Campbell and Cockburn was that under the former's
view the scope of the act would be much more narrow than under the
latter's. Campbell's net would trap only products intended for sexually
immature adolescents, but Cockburn's would include Campbell's criteria
plus much literature directed only to adults. This emphasis on protect-
6. For background on English obscenity law, see Lloyd, Obscenity and the Law, 9
CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 75 (1956); Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature,
52 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1938).
7. LLOYD, supra note 6, at 79.
8. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
9. The United States courts adopted the Hicklin test as early as 1879. United States
v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879). The first major judicial
attack on Cockburn's rule did not come until 1933. United States v. One Book Called
"Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the United States Supreme Court
held void for vagueness a state law making it a criminal offense to distribute publica-
tions containing stories of deeds of bloodshed and lust. In Doubleday v. New York,
335 U.S. 848 (1948), the Court, equally divided (Frankfurter not participating), affirmed
the conviction of the publisher of Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County. The
issue before the Court was first amendment protection for obscene literature, the first
time a case had squarely presented this question to the justices.
In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 388 (1957), the Supreme Court ruled that a state statute
incorporating the Hicklin test for obscenity was unconstitutionally broad because it in
effect reduced all reading matter to the level of children.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), found the Court burying the Hicklin rule
explicity, and substituting a new test: "Whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
10. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
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ing young minds remained a central part of Florida obscenity law through
1957.
One of the possible contributing factors, then, of the enactment of the
Florida statute was the English debate over obscenity legislation.
Whether or not the Hicklin test was known to the Florida legislators in
1868, they were probably familiar with the Act of 1857 and the accom-
panying debates. In fact, such an act as that passed by the legislature in
1868 seemed a reasonable consequence of the blending of the Victorian
conscience, the religious and moral fervor of the postwar years, and the
tensions resulting from the social, political, and economic revolutions
then in progress in the South. The second half of the century thus wit-
nessed an interplay of factors which had been latent or largely absent
during the first half.
What did the sponsors of the legislation hope to accomplish? The
record was not sufficiently substantial to support any of several possible
primary motivations. 1 The effort, however, seemed to be one of lead-
ing the youth away from the immoral and the indecent and toward the
good and the proper.'2 Hopefully, by hiding the evil, the elevation of
the spiritual rather than the baseness of the flesh would entice the ado-
lescent Floridian in 1868. Whether or not the legislation appreciably
improved the moral fiber of the younger generation, enough of the older
generation was sufficiently optimistic to have the statute enacted.
The several decades following passage of the 1868 statute witnessed
11. Debate has been rampant during recent years over the effects of obscene matter
on behavior. The change in emphasis from impure thoughts to antisocial behavior has
reflected the belief that government can regulate actions, but not thoughts. If impure
thoughts cause antisocial actions, one then has a stronger case for regulating literature
which produces those thoughts.
[WJhether obscene literature does in fact affect public morals is a highly
debatable question, but the Court recognizes that the American community
seems to think so. The fact that all American legislative bodies, state and
federal, have enacted antiobscenity laws does suggest that the belief on
which they are founded may not be so clearly unreasonable as to justify
a judge's putting his own personal judgment or his understanding of modem
psychiatry against them.
FE. mAN, The Essential Nature of American Constitutional Law in EssAYs IN LEGAAL
HIsToRY IN HONOR oF FELIX FRANKFURtTER 550 (M. Forkosch ed. 1966). See also
M. ERNST & W. SEAGLE, To THE PURE . . ., at 239 (1928); G. Sco-r, INTo WHOSE
HANDS 5 (1961); Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumption of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MIN. L. Rnv. 1009 (1962).
12. It is the effort to control personal morality to which many object today. See
Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 391
(1963).
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occasional prosecutions -for sale and distribution of obscene matter, the
first conviction under the statute to reach the supreme court of Florida
being Reyes v. State.3 The supreme court reversed the trial court, how-
ever, because the indictment did not give a description of the material
in haec verba.14 While counsel for the defense argued that the matter
was not in fact obscene, the justices chose to reverse on procedural
grounds. A similar case came up for review in 1928 and the supreme
court again reversed, this time on the authority of Reyes. 5
Such was the extent of the high court's participation in the state's
obscenity law until 1957. The statute gave rise to convictions from time
to time, but very few found their way to the supreme bench. The
justices over a period of about ninety years never once had to define
obscenity or to interpret the scope of the 1868 statute.
The failure to find obscenity cases on the supreme court's docket was
not necessarily a sign that officials were not enforcing the law or that
Florida was open to obscene publications. Enforcement of the law, in-
stead, varied from county to county, with the coastal and tourist cen-
ters generally tending to be more tolerant of the questionable material.
Often enforcement of the statute would not involve a prosecution and
conviction, but only a confiscation and a warning. Most censorship and
suppression of obscenity was informal, focusing community pressure on
one whose business habits were in derogation of majority opinion.
Few wished to risk the wrath of their neighbors, and transient salesmen
could expect at best a hostile reception or at worst the rail if community
leaders found them peddling printed filth in the schoolyard.' 6 In short,
pressure for official enforcement of the statute was low key, and most
suppression of obscenity resulted from the conforming force of com-
munity opinion.: 7
At the conclusion of hostilities in 1945, much of Florida underwent a
cultural shock. The appearance of a massive tide of paperback books
13. 34 Fla. 181, 15 So. 875 (1894).
14. "The indictment should give such description of the paper, figure or picture as
decency permits." Id. at 183, 15 So. at 875 (Liddon, C. J.).
15. Vannoy v. State, 115 So. 510 (Fla. 1928).
16. Judge Bok has called community opinion "the real censor who controls our
freedom to read, to be spoken to, and to be silent." Bok, The Duty of Freedom,
SATURDAY RavIEw, July 11, 1953, at 27.
17. The reader should of course remember that obscenity, like gambling and vice,
thrived in particular sections of the state where the wealthy tourist's demands were
met. Often, such conditions existed regardless of vocal "community opinion" to the
contrary.
[Vol. 1.1: 106
WRITTEN OBSCENITY
and "girlie" magazines swept many civic and religious groups into
action, and produced a reaction which confronted the onslaught of
printed sordidness with a moral barrier.'8 To combat the evil, Floridians
begot numerous official and semiofficial vigilante groups which operated
in most of the major towns and cities.19 The mayor of a community
would appoint leading ladies of the town to a censorship board, or a
progressive literature group would create its own reviewing panel. In
either case, the results were very much the same. The board members
would examine newsstands for salacious publications and would hear
complaints from parents who had discovered an "arte magazine beneath
junior's pillow. If the board decided certain matter was obscene-and
such a finding was not infrequent-its members would suggest prosecu-
tion to the local solicitor who in turn would warn the accused dealers
of impending punishment. Usually, the dealers were more than happy
to remove objectionable literature from sale, and submission to the
board's determination was normally sufficient to forestall actual prosecu-
tion.
While agencies and citizens' groups were occasionally on guard in
most Florida communities, the search for obscenity in certain towns and
cities went forward vigorously and relentlessly. In Miami, for example,
the Censorship Board banned Good Times and Vue in 1953, though
on the recommendation of Police Chief Headley, the Board took no
action against a calendar featuring Marilyn Monroe in the nude. Mrs.
Regina L. McLinden, chairman of the Board, explained that the calendar
was simply "traditional American calendar art." At the same time, a
magazine containing a photographic layout of the Broadway show "Can-
Can" almost fell under the Board's censure. A local attorney, however,
reported that he had seen the show in New York City and did not con-
sider it obscene. Mrs. McLinden deferred to him.20
In late 1954, the police chief in nearby Miami Beach sent a squad of
police to all newsstands in the city, instructing the dealers to clear "nudist
books and so-called art magazines" from the shelves. In the meantime,
18. See P. SORoxIN, Tim AMRFCAiN SEx REVOLuTON (1956); Rorty, The Harassed
Pocket-Book Publishers, 15 AN'TOCH RFv. 411 (1956); Kerr, A Pox on Shocks, N. Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1967, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
19. Such groups blossomed, forth throughout the country. See generally Note, En-
tertaimnent: Public Pressures and the Law, 71 HAav. L. Rxv. 326 (1957).
20. American Book Publishers Council, Bulletin, Nov. 27, 1953, at 8. [hereinafter
cited as Bulletin].
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a Miami group pushed for a statewide censorship board patterned after
the Georgia Literature Commission.2
Both the municipal government and private groups waged war on
obscene literature in West Palm Beach. During the spring of 1954, the
city commission prepared an ordinance banning all obscene publications
from sale. After protests by the American Book Publishers Council and
the Comic Magazine Publishers, the city agreed to rewrite the ordi-
nance, since little of the first draft would have stood up in court.22 The
city commission decided in November of 1954 to pass the revised version,
but gave the dealers until January 31, 1955, "to clean house." 23 Later
in the new year the commission debated a tougher ordinance, but agreed
not to adopt the new measure in order to give the local junior chamber
of commerce opportunity to conduct its own anti-obscenity campaign.24
Feeling in Jacksonville reached fever pitch in the fall of 1954 when the
mayor signed ordinances creating a board to censor comic books and
other publications.2  The authorities in Jacksonville Beach adopted a
similar program, and the commissions in thirteen other communities
received recommendations at this time for such boards.2 By February
of 1955, members of the Jacksonville Board of Literary Review could
report that "objectionable comic books have practically disappeared from
the shelves of local book dealers." As usual, most of the censorship in
Jacksonville and Jacksonville Beach was extralegal, for despite the mass
removal of many publications from sale, the censorship boards only re-
ferred one magazine and one paperback to the city attorneys for possible
prosecution. The Jacksonville Board ventured a remark on March 2,
1955, that "lewd covers on cheap books displayed to attract child cus-
tomers" were often suspect.27
21. Bulletin, July 14, 1955, at 6. The State of Georgia centralized anti-obscenity
efforts in the Georgia Literature Commission, a quasi-judicial body. See Fleming, The
Georgia Literature Commission, 18 MERCER L. Rzv. 325 (1967).
22. Bulletin, May 25, 1954, at 11.
23. Id., Dec. 28, 1954, at 3.
24. Id., July 14, 1955, at 6.
25. John Milton apparently had little regard for the state-appointed censor.
If he be of such worth as behooves him, there cannot be a more tedious
and unpleasing journeywork, a greater loss of time levied upon his head,
than to be made the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets ....
[W]e may easily foresee what kind of licenser we are to expect hereafter,
either ignorant, imperious, and remiss, or basely pecuniary.
J. MroN, AREOPAGITIcA 20-21 (Everyman ed. 1927).
26. Bulletin, Dec. 28, 1954, at 4.
27. Id., July 14, 1955, at 6.
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The censorious elements were also active in the capital city of Talla-
hassee, working within the shadow of the handsome supreme court build-
ing. Community pressure for municipal action mounted during 1954,
but the city commission first rejected the notion that government should
"tell people what they can read, and what they can't," and set aside a
proposed ordinance.2 Later in the year, however, demands grew for a
municipal ban of some type, so the commission relented in December
and forbade the sale of obscene literature generally and crime comics to
persons under eighteen, Despite vigorous opposition by the Tallahassee
Democrat, the commission established an advisory committee with au-
thority to screen material which distributors planned to put on sale.29
The Winter Haven and St. Petersburg commissions adopted review or-
dinances similar to Tallahassee's. Although the St. Petersburg Indepen-
dent approved the move, the city's Times commented,
If this ordinance is passed and enforced, St. Petersburg will out-
Boston Boston .... Perhaps the police will have to search our
libraries (many copies of Snow White are available in the city
library).30
With the war against obscenity reaching its peak in 1955, the maze
of prosecutions and official and unofficial threats was bound to result in
an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. In 1957, a racy newspaper ar-
ticle presented the court with its first chance for review, and the justices
used the opportunity to offer a lengthy discourse on the nature, purpose,
and destiny of obscenity law and morality in Florida.
28. Id., Dec. 28, 1954, ar 4.
29. id., July 14,1955, at 6.
30. Id. Community campaigns can be humorous. Earl Finbar Murphy sees the
"malerotic element which leaves the modem conventional moral reformers indifferent.
They burn copies of Sunshine and Health, while on a billboard above them, unnoticed,
a nearly naked woman with an enticing smile hands an open can of beer to a leering
man in swim trunks." Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. RFv. 655,
671 (1964).
A survey of community action in Florida was proof enough for the contention that,
[w]e should not be exclusively obsessed with formal legislation. Ambiguous
as it often is, it is in the open: informal censorship, subtle and pervasive,
is hiding all around us, permeating even the figures of everyday speech.
In the exploration of informal censorship lie the greatest perplexities and
the greatest potential rewards. Our questions must be addressed, not only
to the learned Magistrate, but also to that busy if enigmatic individual, the
Man in the Street.
C. & W. RrsssEu., The Natural History of Censorship, in To DEPRAvE AND CosRw-r,
supra note 2, at 174.
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One Reuben J. Clein of Miami Life published on April 30, 1955, an
article relating to possible sexual perversions between a black man and a
white girl. Dade County prosecuted Clein for violating the obscene
literature statute, dating with few modifications from 1868, but the cir-
cuit court quashed the charge because, in the judge's opinion, the evi-
dence did not show the article to be obscene beyond reason. The state
appealed.31
The seven justices of the state's supreme court were unanimous on
the judgment to reverse the trial court, though two of them entered
separate concurring opinions. Justice O'Connell spoke for five
justices, stating that where reasonable men might differ as to the ques-
tion of obscenity, the case was one for the jury. Therefore, the trial
judge erred in granting the motion to quash.
Clein admitted that he published the article, but claimed that even if
obscene, the article was not the kind of obscenity which would arouse
the sexual passions of youth. Rather, "if it would do anything, it would
arouse disgust." 32 Since the statute allegedly applied only to the lustful
kind of obscenity, he claimed he had committed no offense under the act.
The question before the court was whether the trial judge had com-
mitted reversible error in granting the motion to quash. Justice O'Con-
nell admitted as much, and ruled on the point early in his opinion. The
case presented, however, an opportunity to deliver the court's first
definitive statement on obscenity in Florida. Seizing his pen, Justice
O'Connell ventured beyond the line of necessity and crossed into the
realm of judicial lawmaking.
As a matter of law, one could not say that the article was not obscene
because it included more than just sexually stimulating material. Cer-
tainly the article was "offensive to chastity of mind or to modesty,"
and thus within a legitimate definition of obscenity.
Many of the reported cases dealing with the question of obscenity
involve statutes wherein no test of obscenity is given. In such cases,
the generally accepted rule is that matter is obscene if it would tend
to deprave and corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open
to such influences and into whose hands such matter might fall by
suggesting or inciting lewd or lascivious thoughts or desires. 33
31. State v. Clein, 93 So. 2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1957).
32. Id. at 879.
33. Id. at 881.
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The Florida Court did not have to resort to the Hicklin rule, however,
because the legislature had defined the obscene as that ".... manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." For Justice O'Con-
nell, the legislature had in mind something more than sexual standards:
As we understand the word morals it means the code of conduct
adopted and used by a particular people at a particular time. Such
code expresses in thought and action the consensus of opinion of
a people as to what is or is not acceptable in the conduct of per-
sons in that community at that time. This code of conduct is
formulated and taught to a people by its churches, its schools, to
children by parents, and is influenced by the actions and conduct
of friends, neighbors, and associates. Parts of such code or stan-
dard are also frequently expressed by the people, through their
elected representatives, in the enactment of statutes and ordinances.
Such code of conduct determines and is morals. It must and does
encompass more than sexual conduct. It relates as well to common
decency, cleanliness of mind and body, honesty, truthfulness, and
proper respect for established ideals and institutions, among other
things.3 4
Even the casual observer might have queried whether in any American
state in the mid-twentieth century one could point to a comprehensive
code of conduct to which almost all would agree. Even if one be-
grudged Mr. Justice O'Connell's extension of fact, the implications
of his statement were astounding. The obscenity statute, at least in
the eyes of five justices, protected the minds of youth against any sort
of nonconformist thought, on topics ranging from table manners to
clothing styles.35
The purpose of O'Connell's discourse was to broaden the meaning of
34. Id. at 882.
35. "So long as a man howl with the wolves, he may say whatever monstrous thing
occurs to him; if he howls against the wolves, it may cost him his job, his social posi-
tion, and perhaps his liberty." Bok, supra note 16, at 27.
If the appointed censors question the motives of those who write about sex, others
have questioned the motives of the censors.
Censorship has an inevitable attraction for the least enlightened and most
intolerant and regressive elements in society, those who throughout history
are forever trying to put not only themselves into uniforms, but everyone
else too. It is for this reason that the issue of pornography is an important
one; it has been used, as blasphemy once was, to justify censorship.
CHANDos, Unicorns at Play, in To DxrvAvE A1D CoaRuPT, supra note 2, at 206.
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obscenity to encompass more than the sexually arousing.30 The justice
agreed with Alexander Pope that, "Vice is a Monster of so frightful
mien as to be hated needs but to be seen. Yet seen too oft, familiar
with her face, we first endure, then pity,. then embrace." 37 That is,
O'Connell feared that even coarse and crude references to sex would
dissolve the moral fiber of Florida's youth.
When familiarity is said to breed contempt, we have no doubt that
familiarity with obscenity will lessen aversion to it and make it
more acceptable. To the extent that obscenity becomes more
acceptable morals are lessened and corrupted.38
The justice's attempt to broaden the definition of obscenity was per-
haps shrewd-at least he would help assure Clein's conviction. But in
his efforts to enlarge sufficiently, he cast the statutory net so wide that
the law now encompassed, by judicial fiat, almost all thought and
opinion which could in any way relate to community standards, even
of the meanest sort.39
While O'Connell disclaimed the Hicklin rule as the Florida test, the
statute did require that questioned matter, in order to constitute ob-
scenity, must tend to corrupt the morals of youth. With his powerful
grasp of interpretative techniques, O'Connell proceeded to incorporate
the Hicklin test into the Florida act. This specification that the matter
tend to corrupt youth actually gave the law a sweeping effect.
[I]t would appear to us that obscenity which would not affect
the morals of the average normal person, could nevertheless affect
the morals of youth, with its generally recognized lack of experi-
36. Howard Moody has proposed perhaps the broadest definition of the obscene.
"What is obscene is that material, whether sexual or not, that has as its basic motivation
and purpose the degradation, debasement and dehumanizing of persons." Moody,
Toward a New Definition of Obscenity, 24 CHISTIANITY & Caisis 284, 286 (1965).
37. 93 So. 2d 876, 882 (Fla. 1957).
38. Id.
39. O'Connell viewed society as a stagnant entity.
Literature ... should not be asked to embody the values of the time. Litera-
ture should disseminate ideas, not moralities. If the author's ideas jar the
prevailing mores, it is not the ideas which must be suppressed; both can exist
cotaneously [sic], and both must so exist if society is not to stagnate, decay,
and die. Moralities change; ideas develop; and the change in morals springs
from the development of ideas. In this sense, to limn with a broad brush,
poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.
Alpert, supra note 6, at 75.
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ence, its venturesome spirit, its sponge-like. mind, and its willing-
ness to experiment with something new. 40
The legislature, then, "intended to measure by its effects on the morals
of youth and thereby to give youth and its morals additional, not less,
protection, than would have been given under a statute merely declar-
ing against obscenity." 4 1 What test was this, in effect, if not the Hicklin
test, which measured obscenity by the probable effect on minds which
might review the material, including children? True, the Hicklin rule
could refer to any group in society, but the most common reference
group in its legal history was youth.
Regardless of the rule to be applied, however, the community as
represented on the jury was rightly the body to decide whether con-
duct violated public standards.
There is good reason for requiring the question of obscenity and
effect on morals to be submitted to a jury for it is the people of a
community who have the right to establish their standard of morals
and it should be the people who apply the standard to specific con-
duct and who determine whether such conduct is offensive and
harmful or not. This can best be done through a jury.42
Justice O'Connell evidently presumed that the jurors did in fact repre-
sent community opinion in some way. By "community" he probably
meant geographical community-the area from which the jurors came.
The justice also presumed that one group of jurors would rule sim-
ilarly to another group of twelve coming from the same geographical
district, or so it appeared when the justice presumed a community
standard and a jury to divine its contents. That on one occasion the
jurors could reflect agrarian or blue collar values and on another
occasion sophisticated white collar and professional values did not appear
to trouble Justice O'Connell. Clearly, while two juries might be drawn
from the same county, they might easily represent two entirely distinct
intellectual communities.
His discourse on the preeminent place of the jury reminded the
justice that his own opinion might reflect a judgment that Clein's
article was obscene. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding,
40. 93 So. 2d 875, 883 (Fla. 1957).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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O'Connell claimed only to declare the law, leaving application to the
jury.
We do not hold by this opinion that the article in question was
obscene or that it manifestly tends to corrupt the morals of youth.
We carefully refrain from doing so for if we did we would be
going beyond our province which is to declare the law. If we went
further we would not only be invading the province of the jury but
would be imposing upon the people by judicial fiat our view of
what the morals of the community should be. This is a matter for
the people to decide for themselves. 43
What O'Connell no doubt knew and Clein painfully saw was that the
court had written the obscenity law of Florida to encompass Clein's
article. The chances were good that a jury would find the article dis-
tasteful, and thus obscene.
Despite Justice O'Connell's sweeping phrases, Justice Crosly per-
haps echoed voices from the judicial conference when he emphasized
that the statute was not as broad as O'Connell's opinion indicated.
For those who might regard this decision as a license to inaugurate
a "witch hunt," it should be emphasized that in the trial of such a
charge the burden remains upon the state at all times to prove every
essential allegation of the information beyond and to the exclusion
of every reasonable doubt.44
Crosly's reminder was worth noting, but most likely the ears of the
soldiers in the obscenity campaign throughout the state did not make
the most fertile ground for his seeds of wisdom and restraint.
The astonishing fact about the Clein decision was its date-1957,
the year of Butler v. Michigan45 and Roth v. United States.46 One could
have expected O'Connell's opinion in 1900, and indeed his thoughts
suggested those of jurists from an earlier day.47 Even more astonishing
was Justice Roberts' note in a concurring opinion, directing his col-
43. Id. at 884.
44. Id.
45. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
46. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
47. See, for example, several early Georgia cases: Holcombe v. State, 5 Ga. App.
47, 62 S.E. 647 (1908); Montross v. State, 72 Ga. 261 (1884); DUllard v. State, 41 Ga.
270 (1870).
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leagues' attention to the Butler decision by the United States Supreme
Court. In Clein, the Florida Supreme Court applied, reinforced, and
broadened a statute almost identical to the Michigan act which had
fallen beneath the judgment of the supreme federal bench.4S
The Butler decision, however, did provoke a change in Florida's ob-
scenity statute, the first major alteration and renovation of the act
since its passage in 1868. The response by the legislature to the United
States Supreme Court's ruling was the first move in what one could
describe as a federal-state checker game. The United States Supreme
Court comprised one side, and the Florida legislature and supreme
court the other. A play by the high federal bench produced a cor-
responding reaction in Florida, with state agencies and institutions mak-
ing their moves against obscenity within the limits set by the supreme
bench. The Florida Supreme Court reluctantly blended the new fed-
eral rules with local law, tradition, and custom, to fashion the state's
approximation of the national standards.
Convinced that the heart of the 1868 statute, with the primary test
being effects on youth, would not survive a test in the federal courts,
the legislators agreed in 1957 to remove this stark feature of the law.
While desiring to stay within the scope of constitutional interpretation
offered by the United States Supreme Court, the legislators were
alarmed over the prospects of mass publication of ribald literature. In
a preamble to the new law of 1957, the legislature confessed that ob-
scene literature was "easily obtainable by anyone in this state regard-
less of age.... ." Moreover, minors under seventeen "are often greatly
influenced by such articles because of their inability to place them
in their proper perspective as outward manifestations of the sadistic and
depraved nature of those who produce and distribute them. . . ." The
circulation of the literature contributed to juvenile crime and constituted
"a clear and present danger to the people of this state" because the ma-
terial impaired "the ethical and moral development of the youth. .. "
By eliminating "this source of contamination," the. legislature hoped
that the purer atmosphere could "thereby strengthen the moral fibre
of the people of Florida... ." ,49
The revised statute itself dropped the reference to corrupting the
morals of youth, but prohibited the selling and displaying of "any
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, degrading, sadistic,
48. 93 So. 2d 875, 884 (Fla. 1957).
49. FLA. LAWS ch. 57-779, Preamble (1957).
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masochistic or disgusting" matter. Within these adjectives, the state
hoped to continue the war against obscenity and at the same time not
derogate from the latest federal directives.50
Curiously, the statute contained no definition of the obscene, un-
less the legislators intended the adjectives following the word "ob-
scene" to be synonymous with obscenity. The writing of the statute
apparently occurred before the Roth decision where the justices identi-
fied the obscene with matter, which, when taken as a whole and
judged by contemporary community standards, appealed to the pru-
rient interest of the average man. It was unfortunate that the new
statute included no definition, for the Clein decision of the Florida
Supreme Court related to the 1868 statute, and for all practical pur-
poses the new law made Justice O'Connell's opinion obsolete.
If the 1957 act met the requirements of the Butler decision, its pro-
visions fell short of the demands of the Roth test. The only real change
in the statute was the removal of the youth corruption clause dis-
solved by Butler. Therefore, even on the surface the Florida obscenity
law seemed out of line with federal rulings at the end of 1957.
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed an obscenity conviction in
1958, but delays in appealing Matthews v. State5' created complications.
A long-time resident of Duval County, Matthews operated a small
neighborhood jewelry store in Jacksonville. In September of 1955, he
showed some pictures displaying sexual intercourse to Linda Raulerson,
who was twelve years old at the time., During the trial, counsel for
Matthews relied on no constitutional arguments, but instead attempted,
unsuccessfully, to impeach young Raulerson's testimony. By the time
the case reached the docket of the Florida Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court had delivered the Butler decision and the Florida
legislature had replaced the statute under which Matthews stood con-
victed.
At the trial, the judge charged the jury in such a way that one
could not be certain of the basis of the conviction.
Now, the word obscene as used in the Statutes making the exhibi-
tion of obscene pictures a felony means not only pictures or prints
50. Id. § 1. Judges spoke of obscenity, immorality, and the debauching of public
morals, "language that can close and open like an umbrella, depending on whether the
particular individuals involved choose to make it do so.' Landis, A Lawyer Looks at
Censorship, in PROTECTION OF PUBLIC MORALS THROUGH CENsoRsHIP 2 (1953).
51. 99 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1957).
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suggestive of sexual intercourse or tending to exercise lewdness,
excite lewdness, or to debauch public morals of youth, but means
offensive to the senses, repulsive, disgusting, foul, filthy, offensive
to modesty or decency, impure, unchaste, indecent, and lewd.
Now, whether or not the pictures in this case are obscene pic-
tures tending to the corruption of the morals of youth is largely
a question of your own conscience and your own opinions. Before
it can be said of such pictures, it must be calculated with the ordi-
nary viewer to deprave him or her, deprave his or her morals or
lead to impure purposes.
It is your duty to ascertain in the first place, if the said pictures
are calculated or intended to lower that standard which we regard
as essential to civilization if they are calculated or intended to
excite those feelings which in their proper field are all right, but
which transcending the limits of that proper field play most of the
mischief in the world.52
6
The Duval judge wove an obscenity test from a curious blend of the
Hicklin rule, average person test, prurient interest, and personal opin-
ion. The jury found Matthews guilty, though one could only guess
which test or tests the jurors applied in their deliberations.
Before the supreme court, Matthews' counsel had the Butler decision
in his arsenal of argument. The old statute violated freedom of
speech because the law prohibited exhibition of pictures to the general
public on the basis of the undesirable influences on youth, and because
the statute failed to provide a sufficiently definite standard of guilt. The
appellant relied heavily on Butler and quoted extensively from Frank-
furter's opinion in that case.5 3
The state tried to distinguish Butler by reminding the court that
Michigan had another statute which forbade selling or showing obscene
matter to youth.
Unlike the State of Michigan, the Florida statute . . . is the only
legislative protection from such acts that this little girl has, to-
gether with all the other little girls in the State of Florida.54
The state assured the court that,
by no stretch of the imagination can the Florida Statute be con-
strued to forbid any adult person to have in good faith . . . for his
52. Id. Record, at 144-45.
53. Id. Brief for Appellant at 3.
54. Id. Brief for Appellee at 10.
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ownh'personal use any type of literature or other articles recited
in the Statute.55
The legislature designed the act to protect the youth of Florida. "It is
aimed directly at the heart of the evil which is sought to be cured." 11
The state's self-restricting construction swayed all but two justices to
affim the conviction. The court announced the result in a per curiam
opinion. Observers felt, however, that the majority saw the question as
one of Matthews' detention in jail. The old statute was no more, and
given the state's restricted interpretation, the justices could see no harm
in affirming. If tried again, they thought the jury would simply convict
under the 1957 statute. Besides, Matthews had not raised the constitu-
tional arguments in the trial court.
But the state's rationale did not persuade the entire bench. Justice
Drew joined Justice Roberts in a powerful dissent. Roberts himself had
noted the Butler decision in his Clein concurrence of the previous year,
and he objected to his colleagues' failure to read the signs of the times.
[T]his court will review and will correct on appeal an error
of a "fundamental nature" even though timely objection was not
made in the lower court.... [C]learly, a person who is subjected
to a punishment not authorized by any law has suffered an invasion
of a fundamental right; and if the statute under which he is con-
victed is wholly invalid, it is though it had never been enacted.
57
But the protest of Justice Roberts was to no avail. Matthews remained
in jail, and the United States Supreme Court denied review.58
The legislature amended the obscenity statute in 1959,1" but in 1960,
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id. at 10.
57. 99 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1957).
58. 356 U.S. 918 (1958). Matthews sued for a writ of habeas corpus in 1959 and
obtained release from the Florida Supreme Court because his conviction rested on an
unconstitutional statute. Curiously, Justice Roberts dissented. State ex rel. Matthews
v Culver, 114 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1959). But the first positive recognition which the
Florida Court gave to the Butler decision was State v. Tracey, 102 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1958).
The trial judge threw out obscenity charges on the 1868 statute, and the supreme court
affirmed. The court in Tracey accepted the constitutional arguments even though they
had not been raised in the trial court. The alternative was review of the obscene matter
itself to determine the sufficiency of evidence.
59. The 1959 amendments were procedural and the consequences for appellate cases
were slight. See FLA. LAws ch. 59-360 (1959).
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the Florida Supreme Court had occasion to review the conviction un-,
under the 1957 act of one Cohen for selling an issue of the magazine
Cocktail. Cohen's trial was in the Dade County Circuit Court, and Judge,
George Schulz practically assured a guilty verdict by Is charge to the
jury.
The word "obscene" has been defined in a general sense as meaning
offensive to morality or chastity, indecent or nasty The test ordi-
narily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular
thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes is whether its
tendency to corrupt those whose nunds are open to such im-
moral influences, and into whose hands it may fall.
Another test of obscenity is whether it shocks the ordinary in
common sense of men as indecent, or whether under the circum-
stances it appears to common sense and reason that the subject
matter would tend to deprave the morals of those who might come
into contact with the material, by suggesting lewd thoughts and
exciting sexual desire.
I further charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that in determining
whether the magazine is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent,
immoral or disgusting, it is not enough that the said magazines
might be offensive to propriety, refinement or good taste, but
whether to the average person applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient or lewd and lascivious mterest60
Judge Schulz had done his homework, but had failed to reach a syn-
thesis m his thinking or to decide on the proper test for obscenity
Receiving a charge compounded with Hicklin and Roth, the jurors
were probably thrown to their own opinions as tests for obscenity, In
one moment Judge Schulz reminded them of the youthful minds wich
nught read the magazine, and in the next he cautioned the jurors to ap-
ply the average person standard. And who was the average person? The
jurors had only themselves for guides.
The problems for the accused had only begun with Judge Shulz's
mulitest rule for obscenity. Once deciding that the magazine was ob-
scene, the jurors had to answer a second question: whether Cohen-pub-
60. Record at 83, 85, Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960). The Roth test came
largely from the Model Penal Code. See Schwartz, Crrnnal Obscenity Law: Portents
from Recent Supreme Court Decisions and Proposals of, the American Law Institute
in the Model Penal Code, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 8 (1957).
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lished or sold or committed "any other act in reference to the obscene
article which the statute prohibits, irrespective of whether the defendant
had knowledge of the contents of the alleged obscene article, and had
only the highest and best purposes, which will not amount to a defense
if the article is obscene within the meaning of the statute." 61
On appeal to the supreme court of Florida, a unanimous bench re-
versed Cohen's conviction for the trial judge's failure to require sci-
enter. The question of scienter arose from the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Smith v. California,2 where the Court reversed a judg-
ment convicting a bookseller because the state had not shown that the
dealer knew the item sold was obscene.
The appeal presented a real challenge to the attorney general's office,
for the significance of scienter would almost insure a reversal of
Cohen's conviction. As one state attorney who participated in the
case said, "This was a loser right from the start. Our problem was to
decide how best to lose it." The state could save the statute and free
Cohen, or it could lose both. Little possibility existed that the state
could both punish Cohen and save the statute except by some sort of
legal miracle. No such miracle was in the offing, so the state sketched
the plan to free Cohen and save the statute. To accomplish this goal,
the state would have to persuade a majority of the justices to read the
scienter requirement into the 1957 act.
The strategy worked. Justice O'Connell held that "scienter is not
prescribed in the statute." As written, the statute "makes it a crime to
sell or distribute any . . . article of the character described herein ir-
respective of whether the person selling or distributing has or does not
have knowledge of the obscene.. . contents of the... article." 63 The
state admitted the trial judge's fundamental error in excluding scienter
and the supreme bench of the state agreed with this conclusion. While
the court commended the state for the candor displayed, O'Connell
reprimanded the state for so tardy an admission. "[H]ad it made the
admission earlier in the proceedings the time involved in the ultimate
disposition of this cause could have been shortened materially." 64
Responding to the state's request to bring the statute in line with
the Smith decision, the court read scienter into the 1957 act.
61. Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 1960).
62. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
63. Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1960).
64. Id. at 563.
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[S]cienter or knowledge of the obscene, lewd, etc. character of
the books and other articles described in the statute is impliedly
included in the statute. This means that one prosecuted under the
statute must be charged with having committed the acts prohibited
with knowledge of the obscene character of the documents or
articles involved, and further that the state must prove such knowl-
edge of the accused at the trial.6s
Because the United States Supreme Court failed to clarify the point,
the Florida Supreme Court would not specify how the prosecution
must prove scienter. "We do state that it is not necessarily required
that the state prove that one charged has in fact read the obscene
matter referred to in the charge." 66
The Florida justices were generally willing to let their brethren in
Washington carry the ball of smut and obscenity. Few Florida appel-
late judges expressed admiration for the United States Supreme Court's
leadership in obscenity law since Butler and Roth in 1957. At the same
time, most admitted privately their awareness of the seemingly impos-
sible task the federal justices had assumed in trying to find a workable
and constitutionally acceptable test. Obscenity was a topic they would
almost prefer to leave to the federal courts, but they flinched at the
thought of having to apply someone else's unworkable test. Sifting
through a basket of nudist magazines did not strike the appellate judges
as a profitable way to spend one's time. The sifting and reading should
occur at the trial, and the reviewing court's role should be minimal.
This attitude possibly rested upon a revulsion at the sordid nature of
much of the literature arrested by the government and involved in
prosecutions. Perhaps, too, the attitude came from a lack of concern
for free expression when one's freedom to distribute questioned litera-
ture was at stake. For most of the Florida appellate judiciary, much of
65. Id.
66. Id. at 564. Justice Roberts suggested in a concurring opinion that scienter "does
not set up any insurmountable barrier against providing proof of conviction. Indeed,
it would appear that the continued sale of the offensive publication after any person
had called the obscene contents to the attention of the vendor would be sufficient." Id.
In 1961, the supreme court unanimously affirmed an obscenity conviction in Tracey
v. State, 130 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1961). The trial court had found Tracey guilty of selling
obscene books but counsel delayed the scienter argument until oral argument before
the supreme state bench. Unlike the Cohen decision, the Florida justices did not view
the lack of scienter as fundamental error. Tracey sold the book upon a customer's
request for a "dirty book," and the supreme court perhaps felt that this sale itself
implied scienter.
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the matter was filth and as such was neither socially redeeming nor
socially important.
Shortly after the Cohen decision, the First District Court of Appeal
affirmed a declaratory judgment by the Duval County Circuit Court in
Rachleff v. Mahon,6 a case involving twenty-six magazines. Neither
side in the trial requested a jury, and the county solicitor offered no
witnesses to prove contemporary community standards by which the
court could judge the obscenity of the magazines. Applying the Roth
test, the trial judge found twenty publications obscene and six not
obscene.
On appeal, Rachleff v. Mahon presented Judge Mason of the district
court of appeal with two key questions which had plagued the United
States Supreme Court since Roth: (1) Did the state have to prove the
contemporary community standards; and (2) Was the obscene limited
to "hard-core" pornography?69
Judge Mason failed to find merit in the contention that the state had
to prove community standards. For the judge to rule without the
benefit of outside testimony and only on the basis of the questioned
matter before him was like
the jury in a criminal case where one is charged with an aggravated
assault to conclude that the weapon involved is a deadly weapon
solely from an examination of the weapon itself. Yet no one would
argue that it would be necessary in such case for the prosecution to
offer oral testimony as to its deadly character. 0
But Judge Mason failed to reach the heart of the issue. If the statute
required that for matter to be obscene, it must be, among other things,
67. Research for this article included interviews with attorneys and appellate judges
in Florida. Anonymity was usually a condition for frank discussion.
68. 124 So. 2d 878 (Fla. App. 1960). Under the 1959 amendments to the obscenity
statute, the trial judge thought the declaratory judgment was required, since the maga-
zines enjoyed second class mail privileges. The amended statute prescribed that
punishment for possession of such second class matter could come only after a court
finding of obscenity.
-69. Mr. Justice Stewart of the United States'Supreme Court has indicated the diffi-
culty of defining "hard-core" as opposed to any other kind of obscenity. In what
will doubtless live as a much-quoted statement in the developing law of obscenity, he
said: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligently doing so. But I know it when I see it...." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US.
184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
70. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So.2d 878, 880 (Fla. App. 1960).
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contrary to contemporary community standards. Mason's ruling pre-
sumed that the trial judge could divine those, standards. Indeed, from
his example, Judge Mason suggested that one could determine obscenity
as easily as he could predict the deadly character of a weapon. By say-
ing that the trial judge somehow, perhaps intuitively, had knowledge
of community standards, Mason avoided the whole problem of the
technique for discovering those standards. 71
Perhaps one would be too critical of Judge Mason to mark his refusal
to walk where the United States Supreme Court had feared to tread.
There was much talk about community, but certainly no consensus
among judges had coalesced to designate the community whose standards
the courts were to apply. Perhaps in upholding the trial judge's refusal
to require state proof of community standards, Judge Mason was
recognizing the probable truth that "community standards" referred
to the standards of those making the determination on obscenity. Even
a parade of literary and social experts through the courtroom would
not necessarily prove community standards, for both the prosecution
and the defense would likely recruit spokesmen to uphold their respec-
tive positions. Even demonstration that certain so-called obscene books
were on sale in a locale would not prove that a local community know-
ingly tolerated them. Such a newsstand demonstration might serve only
to awaken the public to available obscenity and to bring community
sanctions against the very items used in court to prove tolerant com-
munity attitudes.72 Judge Mason, along with his colleagues, was appar-
ently willing to leave leadership and new departures in obscenity law to
the United States Supreme Court.
The Rachleff case also brought to the surface the inclusiveness of
the word "obscene." Judge Mason held that the term prohibited more
than "hard-core" pornography, reaching "any material which is de-
voted not only to the presentation and exploitation of illicit sex, but
also passion, depravity or immorality." "The district judge did not
bother to distinguish between "illicit sex" and "passion," "depravity"
or "immorality," and in effect left unanswered the breadth of the word
"obscene." While not as sweeping as the trial judge's charges in Cohen,
71. For a helpful study of the problem of community attitudes and standards see
Seaton, Obscenity: The Search for a Standard, 13 KAN. L. REv. 117 (1964). See also
M. ERNST & A. LINDEY, TnE CENSOR MARcHIES ON 140-41 (1940).
72. A judge's choice of community, whether "local" or "nationwide," probably was
related in some way to his interest in suppressing obscene literature. In Florida, at
least, the "local" standard would be more restrictive than a "national" one.
73. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878, 882 (Fla. App. 1960).
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Judge Mason refused to confine the meaning of obscenity to a specific
test such as stated in RothJ
By failing to apply the Roth test, Mason confused obscenity law
for the trial judges in his district. The Roth test was no novelty by
1960, and regardless of the possible variations in the scope of its ap-
plication, the rule pointed to a command that a court was to think
twice before judging matter obscene. By using such words as passion,
depravity, and immorality, Judge Mason was in effect coupling them
with the Roth test with which the trial judges were familiar. The
combination could serve only to broaden the scope of Roth or to render
the test a complete anomaly.75
Judge Mason's apparent lack of enthusiasm for a specifically stated
and consistently applied test perhaps had its origins in the judge's under-
standing of the appellate function. "[A] s a reviewing forum we could
not substitute what may be our opinions as to their obscene character
for that of the trial judge, the trier of the facts." 76 Having accepted a
narrow role for the appellate court, Mason could not consistently claim
authority to propound a test for the trial courts of his district to follow.
Any test which he found sufficiently adequate and generally within
the bounds of the statute would suffice. The trial courts were free to
apply the Roth test, but Judge Mason apparently did not think that
he should require them to do so.
While other Florida appellate judges later exhibited more concern
over the uniformity of the test applied and usually adhered to the Roth
test, Judge Mason's attitude regarding the appellate function was not
unique. As one judge said, "We are a court of law and not of justice."
What he meant, he added, was that Justice should be done at the trial
level.
We cannot right all wrongs, even if we were certain of what was
right and what was wrong. In reviewing a case, we look to see
whether the trial judge applied the proper law in the case and
74. Most likely, even the justices who assented to the Roth test in 1957 are not cer-
tain of what it means. Despite the refusal of the Supreme Court justices to restrict
obscenity explicity to Stewart's hard-core variety, the pattern of reversals since Roth
has pointed to a judicial standard which is permissive of all but the hard-core. Ginzberg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), seems to have been a temporary tangent, rather
than a real departure from this trend. By injecting "pandering" into borderline cases,
the justices potentially broadened the scope of the Roth test.
75. For comment on Racbleff, see Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional
Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 685 (1962).
76. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878, 882 (Fla. App. 1960).
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whether or not a reasonable man could rule as he did on the basis
of the evidence before him.- Quite often, we will disagree per-
sonally with the trial judge, but we still give him the benefit of the
doubt. After all, few things are certain, and appellate review some-
times boils down to a matter of tolerance. Again, I say, however,
that the justice of a judicial system depends mainly on your trial
judges. It is at the trial level that most of the harm or good is
done.77
Especially in obscenity cases, this attitude produced local variations in
application of the law. Of course, some judges were willing to admit
that when their personal opinions differed sharply with those of the
trial judge, the appellate judge found reversal easier. In such cases,
the trial judge simply did not appear to be a "reasonable man." 78
This attitude also rested upon a greater concern for orderly pro-
cedure than with the policy implications of every individual case.
That is, for the sake of maintaining what they felt to be the ideal ap-
pellate role, many Florida appellate judges were willing to forsake the
opportunity to direct policy, at least in the field of obscenity law.
They preferred to accept the directions from the United States Supreme
Court, and apply them to their jurisdictions, rather than cut their own
path of policy. Without Supreme Court review on obscenity, the
Florida appellate judges would probably have continued to leave the
larger share of statutory interpretation to the trial courts, interfering
only in the absence of due process or of sufficient evidence. 79
The Florida appellate courts did not give explicit recognition to the
Roth test until 1963. In 1961 the legislature amended the obscenity
statute for a second time and included the Roth definition of obscenity.
The appellate courts, however, did not openly abandon the old for
the new until presented with review of two books from Miami: Pleasure
77. See supra note 67.
78. One appellate judge was critical of the reviewing procedure used by the United
States Supreme Court.
[The Court] can take liberties which we do not feel are open to us. Why,
they will plow through a trial record just like the trial judge, and they do
not hesitate to substitute their judgment for his. I like to think we have the
better way. So many legal questions turn on one's opinions, and I feel that I
should not displace the trial judge's with my own.
79. To the Florida judges, "sufficient evidence" meant reasonable grounds for a
decision. To a justice of the United States Supreme Court, "sufficient evidence" in an
obscenity case meant evidence clear enough to meet the Roth test.
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Was My Business and Tropic of Cancer."0 In March of 1961 he filed
a request for a declaratory judgment against the first book, under the
then applicable statute, last amended in 1959. While the matter was
pending, the legislature amended a portion of the 1959 act, eliminating
the provision authorizing declaratory judgments on the obscenity of a
work. The circuit court allowed the state to alter its request to take
account of the amended statute, and the court issued a declaratory judg-
ment against Pleasure Was My Business despite the statutory repeal.
Applying the test laid down by our Appellate Courts and by the
Florida Statutes, whether to the average person applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the material,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest, it is the opinion and
finding of this Court that the defendant-book is offensive to the
common conscience of this community measured by present day
moral standards of this community and is an obscene book con-
demned by the . . . Statutes.8'
The author of the book was a retired madam of Miami who had
operated a plush house of prostitution in the city during the years be-
fore the Second World War. The language of the book was moderate,
and she made no attempt to describe the intimate business relations her
employees had with the customers. She reserved choice and kind re-
marks for the city and county officials who tolerated her establishment
over the years, and who were occasional, and always welcome, visitors.
One might well consider the book an indictment of the political, as
well as the sexual, morality of the Florida Gold Coast-and perhaps the
politically scandalous subject matter of the book explained in part at
least the state's eagerness to rid Florida of the work. 2
Judge Horton of the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the
state's successful challenge against the book in the circuit court. Despite
repeal of the section of the 1959 act authorizing declaratory judgments,
the state's declaratory judgment act contained ample breadth to include
determination of obscenity.8
80. R. BARtNs, PLE.Astn WAS My BusiNEss (1961). H. MnMzm, TRopIc oF CANCER
(1961).
81. Tralins v. Gerstein, 151 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. App. 1963).
82. The state had made an earlier attempt against Pleasure Was My Business, but
failed. The circuit court refused to declare the book obscene, and the Court of Appeal
for the Third District affirmed. See Gerstein v. "Pleasure Was My Business," 136
So. 2d 8 (Fla. App. 1961).
83. "The circuit courts of the state are hereby invested with authority and original
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Of greatest concern to Judge Horton was that the sale of obscene
literature should not go unpunished.
Since obscenity has never enjoyed the protection of either the
Federal or State Constitutions, no person has the right, under the
guise of freedom of speech or press, to possess, sell or distribute
obscene material.8 4
And to judge obscenity, the Rotb decision provided the rule. " IT] he
test of obscenity is whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, that is to say, arouses
lascivious or lustful thoughts." 85 But as in Rache ff, the application of
this test was primarily the responsibility of the trier of facts, for "an
appellate court will not substitute its judgment on these questions for
that of the trier of fact absent a compelling reason to do so apparent
in the record." 86 Judge Horton found declaratory judgments a useful
weapon against obscenity, and he was not about to permit mere legis-
lative repeal to remove such a formidable power from the courts. In
the eyes of many observers, the declaratory judgment was the most
convenient way to meet the requirement of scienter. Once a court had
judged a book obscene, the police or prosecutor could wave the judg-
ment in the faces of the retailers and distributors, giving fair warning
and free advice so they could clean the objectionable matter from the
shelves.
In addition, the declaratory judgment procedure did not have the
limited effect of an injunctive proceeding. While the court might enjoin
a dealer from selling a particular book or magazine, the injunction
would not prevent his competition three doors down the street from
peddling the publication and reaping sales gains resulting from the pub-
licity surrounding the hearing. With the declaratory judgment, the
antiobscenity squad could use the finding at any bookshop or news-
stand.8 7
jurisdiction and shall have the power upon a fied complaint, to declare rights, status
and other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claned or prayed." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 87.01 (1964).
84. Tralins v. Gerstein, 151 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. App. 1963).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Of course, a court could rule that a dealer's knowledge of the injunction was
sufficient to prove scienter. If so, the injunction could reach-far beyond- the confines
of the enjoined.
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The state was not adverse to the injunction, however, when it was
found useful. After all, a shop willing to pay a fine and to continue
selling a book declared obscene might think twice before trying the
patience of a circuit judge by disobeying a court order to halt sales.88
Sales of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer were so profitable in Miami
that the state secured an injunction against the publisher and a dealer
to bring the mushrooming circulation of the book to a smashing stop.
On appeal, while first challenging the validity of Florida's 1961 ob-
scenity statute, Grove Press, the publisher, dropped that approach and
concentrated on a proof that Tropic of Cancer was not obscene."9 Since
the obscenity of the book rather than the validity of the statute was at
stake, the Florida Supreme Court transferred the case to the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal.9"
Judge Carroll in his opinion for the court was aware of the litigation
which Miller's novels had produced in other states.
Generally, those courts have discussed at some length the filth
which is packed into the work and in its narration of a procession
of sexual episodes. We see no need to elaborate.91
The circuit court had applied the Roth test, and Carroll and his col-
leagues were willing to accept the trial court's ruling. "The finding of
obscenity has not been shown by the appellant to be contrary to the
88. The declaratory judgment proceeding would attract support for the book from
the publisher and others who felt valuable interests at stake. While the court might
declare the book obscene, these interests possessed the necessary resources for appeal, and
on appeal the original finding might fall. Thus, the declaratory judgment was not
always so advantageous for the state. Prosecutors still preferred to arrest the retailers,
for resources and hence the chances for vigorous appeal, were less here. But the in-
surmountable problem that remained was scienter, which for many persons has destroyed
the utility of arrest without prior judicial determination of obscenity.
89. Often the "liberal" argument, as a way of touching base with respectability,
has allowed that "smut for smuts sake" must be rigorously dealt with-for-
getting that this is the only concession the would-be censor has ever needed
to ask. As long as an exception is made for the indefensible or even the
detestable-"Freedom for everybody, except Communists and pornograph-
ers"--then there will be people perfectly prepared to state that you or I are
Communists or pornographers, or their dupes, until we prove to the con-
trary. It is at such times that one remembers why freedom has been said
to be indivisible.
Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex Censorship, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 672, 681
(1955).
90. Grove Press, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 152 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1963).
91. Grove Press, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 156 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. App. 1963).
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law or to the manifest weight and preponderance of the evidence." 9
In neither of the two cases, then, was the appellate court willing to
substitute its own judgment on obscenity for that of the trial court.
Once the trial was concluded, the publisher's only hope was to con-
vince the reviewing court that the trial court either had applied the
wrong test, or had decided against the weight of the evidence. Most
likely, an obscenity ruling against a classic would meet objection from
the appellate courts, and the judges would not hesitate to substitute their
own views on obscenity when the trial court's ruling appeared un-
reasonableY In neither instance was a classic at stake, however, and the
volumes doubtless received a rather cool personal reception from the
reviewing bench. The Florida appellate courts by 1963 used the Roth
test, to be sure, but permitted great discretion in the interpretation
and application of that test.
The United States Supreme Court, however, was more inclined to
examine the books on their merits, and in 1964 the Court reversed both
cases94 in the wake of Jacobellis v. Ohio.95 By resorting to per curiam
judgments in both cases and by listing the maze of judicial opinions
in Jacobellis as authority for the reversals, the Supreme Court puzzled
the Florida judiciary. What was certain, however, was that in Florida
as well as in many other states, the failure of the United States Supreme
Court to adequately define the test of obscenity in Roth resulted in
varying interpretations of obscenity. That is, the Florida trial courts
thought the two books obscene, but the United States Supreme Court
did not. In fact, one could not say that the disagreement on ob-
scenity lay between the Supreme Court and the Florida Court of Ap-
92. Id.
93. But by exempting classics and good literature, the censor may be doing more:
harm than good to his goal.
[I]f pornography is a menace, it must be worse when written skillfully than
if perpetrated clumsily. Enemies of censorship never tire of pointing out
how foolish it is to let susceptible people (if such there be) be swayed by
masters who know exactly how to rouse and stir readers while condemning
the bungling craftsmen who produce American Aphrodite or Sodom in
Union Square.
D. LoTn, THE ERoTic IN LrrERATI'R 31 (1961).
94. Grove Press v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576
(1964).
95. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Here, the United States Supreme Court reversed a convic-
tion for exhibiting an obscene motion picture, but the justices could not agree on their
reasons for doing so. For comment, see O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme
Court: A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NoTnRE DAvxx LAW. 1 (1964).
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peal, for the latter applied a "sufficient evidence" test and did not
reach an independent determination that the books were obscene. The
dispute between the Supreme Court and the Third District Court of
Appeal in these cases turned on the strictness and exactness with which
the appellate court was to examine the application of the Roth test in
the trial court. While Judge Horton was not anxious to substitute his
opinion regarding Pleasure JVas My Business, a majority of the justices
on the supreme federal bench were willing and able to declare that the
trial judge's interpretation of Roth was too restrictive.
The dispute highlighted the difficulty with the Roth test. What
amounted to prurient interest, community standards, and the average
man in the minds of the Florida judge or jury would perhaps fall far
short of an evaluation of the same material by the justices in Washing-
ton. If the terms "lewd" and "lascivious" created barriers of interpreta-
tion through space and time, the terms "prurient" and "community"
presented a similar problem. The Roth test placed a tighter rein on the
filth-hunting prosecutors, but the problem of interpretation seemed in-
soluble. When applying the Roth test, one could presume that the
Florida courts would snare some material which would escape on appeal
to Washington.
If the reversals of the Florida cases contained no insight for the Florida
courts on the meaning of Roth, the reversals did reduce the momentum
of -the antiobscenity drive in Miami, and to a lesser extent in other
parts of the state and the nation. The declaratory judgments and in-
-junctions did not now appear quite as formidable to the retailers and
distributors, and the public's interest in the campaign against obscenity
was beginning to wane.
Informal and extralegal censorship continued in Florida after 1963,
though not at the frantic pace of the previous decade. A recent perusal
of newsstand literature in several Florida cities indicated that most of
the ground that the censorious elements won from the libertarians be-
fore 1960 was gradually recaptured by attrition and sneak attack. Lost
territory, however, could often serve as the basis for future conflict,
so the libertarians have had no reason to be optimistic about the prospect
for years of peace to comeY8
96. Observers are skeptical of the effect of the Ginzburg decision. Few, however, feel
that the Court really means to unleash the state prosecutors. See Redrup v; New York,
386 U.S. 767 (1967).
1 If anything, the test of obscenity is much more limited with the emphasis on "re-
deeming social value" in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a .Woman of
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-CONCLUSIONS
The story of the state appellate courts and written obscenity in
Florida leads one to several conclusions and hypotheses. What can be
learned from this experience? First, a conclusion perhaps almost too
obvious to mention, but an important one- nonetheless, is that state
courts influence public policy, positively or negatively, with the degree
to which such courts exercise a positive influence on policy questions
varying with the subject matter.
The second conclusion requires more elaboration than the first.
Vagueness in a judicial test increases the probability of varying and
unequal applications of that test. A judicial test is a standard for decid-
ing a particular type of litigation, and often an appellate judge de-
termines the test for the trial judge to follow. If the standard is un-
clear, the trial judge may be uncertain of the appellate judge's intent
and may be left with his own interpretation of the words and meaning
of the test. When the- United States Supreme Court introduced the
Roth test in 1957, Justice Brennan used such terms as "prurient in-
terest," "dominant appeal," "community standards," and "social im-
portance." The Supreme Court failed to define these terms in the Roth
opinion and in subsequent cases, leaving state courts with the task of
applying the test to specific pieces of allegedly obscene matter.97
Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 385 U.S. 413 (1966). At the same time, Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), permits courts to focus on the effect of -obscene matter
on a particular audience, such as homosexuals or youths.
Avoiding what otherwise might become a judicial impasse, the Court seems inclined
to approve statutes restricting the sale of obscene matter to minors. See Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S.
676 (1968). See also Comment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67 CoL-M.
L. REv. 1149 (1967).
97. Two recent Florida cases highlight the difficulties of applying Roth. Judge
Carroll of the First District Court of Appeal authored both opinions, affirming the
obscenity rulings from the trial courts.
In the first, Felton v. City of Pensacola, 200 So. 2d 842 (Fla. App. 1967), Carroll
admitted that the "question of what constitutes obscenity falls into one of the most
difficult and mercurial areas of the law today." Id. at 846. He admitted frankly that
any judgment on obscenity was a highly subjective act.
We fully realize the great difficulty faced by a judge or some other person,
who may be charged with the duty of determining whether a certain ma-
terial is obscene or not. Such a determination is largely a subjective thing,
for what is obscene to one person may seem perfectly proper to another.
To paraphrase a poet's words: Obscenity "lies in the mind of the beholder."
Another apt expression might be: "Obscenity to him who obscenity
thinks."
Id. at 848.
Given the subjective nature of an obscenity ruling, the appellate bench was obliged'
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The fact that the Rotb test found little application in the Florida
courts, however, does not prove that vagueness of the standard was the
sole reason. Vagueness permits varied application if a trial judge
dislikes a test and desires to dilute the doctrine. Vagueness almost as-
sures varied application because even sincere and dedicated trial judges
may interpret the standard in several different ways in their efforts
to divine the intent of the appellate bench. In other words, there is a
high probability that a vague test weakens as the words pass through
the corridors of judicial minds and through the sieves of local custom
and morality.
A third point which study of the Florida cases demonstrates is that
the presence of litigation is a sine qua non of a positive policy impact
of a state court-i.e., before a court can act, there must be a case.
Without cases a court does nothing, and its impact on public policy is
therefore a negative one. Again, the point is an obvious one from the
study, but yet a factor which one must consider if he wants to determine
to give great weight to the decision of the trial bench. Also, in this way the decision
was more likely to reflect the prevailing standards in the local community.
[An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier
of the facts, where there is sufficient, competent evidence to support the
triers factual findings. . . . Certainly the judge . . . is in a much better
position than the members of this court to know the "contemporary com-
munity standards" prevailing in the said city.
Id.
A year later, in Nissinoff v. Harper, 212 So. 2d 666 (Fla. App. 1968), Judge Carroll
elaborated.
Our function in this appeal . . . is not to make our own judgment as to
whether the film is obscene, but only to determine whether the evidence
in record supports the finding of obscenity and to see that such finding ac-
cords with the applicable law. We approve the finding on both counts.
The judge of the Court of Record was, under our law, the trier of the
facts, and we have no authority to substitute our judgment for his on
questions of fact, even if we wished to. Observation of this rule is par-
ticularly important here, because the test of obscenity depends upon com-
munity standards, and the judge and other citizens of the community are
better equipped to know those standards than appellate judges living far
away.
Id. at 668.
Judge Carroll, then, would leave for the trial court what Justice Harlan of the United
States Supreme Court is willing to leave for the state courts.
From the standpoint of the Court itself the current approach has required
us to spend an inordinate amount of time in the absurd business of perusing
and viewing the miserable stuff that pours into the Court, mostly in state
cases, all to no better end than second-guessing state judges.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
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the part which state courts play in the American political and legal
system.
An hypothesis which research of the Florida experience indicates is
that apphcation by a state court of Supreme Court doctrine may be
much less than enthusiastic when the state judges are apparently in
strong disagreement with their brethren on the highest court. State
judges may simply refuse to apply the higher doctrine, as did the Florida
appellate judiciary for several years following the introduction of the
Roth obscenity test. Or, even if the state judges recognize a relevant
federal doctrine, including the correct words of a test, application may
in fact reflect the spirit of an older and rejected rule.
A second hypothesis is that a judge's view of the appellate function
is related in part to the issues which confront him. So, the Florida judges
advocated a narrow function in obscenity cases. Did they do so out
of a conscious feeling that the greatest amount of discretion should
rest with the trial judge, or because a limited appellate role would,
more often than not, affirm the convictions of the accused purveyors
of pornography? The point is that a student of state courts should
beware lest an advocate of a limited appellate function hide more basic
policy aims. Perhaps a more thorough study of a single court might
examine the actions of the judges with respect to all cases to see
whether the concept of limited role applies in one field as it does in
another. Though personal policy preferences undeniably play a part in
judicial decision-making, one judge could conceivably subordinate
policy choices in every area to one all-encompassing value preference
regarding the role of his court. With respect to Florida, however, the
evidence from cases and interviews indicated that the judges advocated
a limited review function in part because a restricted appellate role
tended to serve their policy choices.
This study of appellate court treatment of written obscenity in
Florida represents an attempt to gain an insight into the operations of
state courts as participants in the American political system. Only
further investigation can reveal whether the tentative conclusions hold
true for other state courts. In any event, the opportunities for research
are vast, and given the influence which the appellate courts can have
or fail to have on policy within a state, students of politics interested
in the interpretation and application of legal rules within society have
fifty fertile fields of study.
